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Abstract

The central question of my thesis is how different positive emotions affect inhibition.
Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, and Kessler (2010) addressed this question using an antisaccade task
and found that happiness decreased inhibition compared to pride, which they attribute to the
links between pride and long-term goals and happiness and short-term goals. I attempted to
generalize their results to a color-naming Stroop task and predicted that their results would
not generalize because their study had little supporting research and their method had several
limitations. I tested 45 students of the Claremont Colleges and found partial support for
Katzir et al. Participants in the pride condition showed better inhibitory function than
participants in the neutral condition, but I was unable to find differences in inhibitory
function between participants in the pride and happiness or happiness and neutral conditions.
The results suggest that pride improved inhibitory function compared to neutral emotion, but
happiness had no effect. I conclude that further research is needed to confirm the supposed
distinction between pride and happiness, the strength of the links between happiness, pride,
and different goals, and the motivational role of emotion in inhibition.
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Emotion and Inhibition: Pride Versus Happiness
I am in a piano recital in a darkened auditorium and someone takes a picture. The
flash is bright, but I do not look up and I continue to play. I am throwing shot put in a track
meet and hear the gun go off for a race. The sound is startling, but I do not turn toward it and
I stay focused on my form. In both of these simple situations, I use my executive system,
particularly prepotent response inhibition, which is the ability to deliberately suppress
dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses (Sun et al., 2009). Inhibition, like most
executive functions, is affected by emotion. In a sad mood, it might be difficult for me to
focus and successfully avoid looking at the flash of light, hold back the scream, or restrain
myself from turning toward the tap on my shoulder. In a happy mood, it might be just as
difficult for me to successfully inhibit. There are various theories and predictions as to how
emotion affects the success of inhibition, some of which attempt to go beyond the effect of
valence to separate the effects of different emotions of the same valence.
Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, and Kessler (2010) examined the effects of the positive
emotions of pride and happiness on inhibition. They hypothesized that feelings of pride
would increase inhibition compared to feelings of happiness because pride is linked to longterm goals, whereas happiness is linked to short-term goals. Katzir et al. found that
imagining a happiness-eliciting event decreased inhibition on an antisaccade task compared
to imagining a pride-eliciting event, as measured by the proportion of correct responses on
the task. Katzir et al.’s results are used to support a theory by which the effect of emotions
on executive processes is due to the motivational role of distinct emotions. Katzir et al.’s
findings are interesting because the influence of emotions on executive functions is typically
attributed to the neurophysiological consequences of emotion (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999)
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or to emotion’s consumption of cognitive resources (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, &
Williams, 1996; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Katzir et al.’s theory differs from
these more accepted hypotheses because it attributes the influence of emotions on executive
function to their direct effect on motivation. Because Katzir et al. was a relatively recent
study, however, there is a dearth of studies that test Katzir et al.’s hypothesis. Furthermore,
there are some questionable aspects of Katzir et al.’s procedure. For my thesis, I will
determine whether Katzir et al.’s results can be extended to another executive function task
that taps inhibition, the Stroop task. Here, I discuss the role of executive functions,
specifically inhibition, the ways inhibition is studied, and the effects of emotion on executive
functions. I conclude this review of literature with a discussion of Katzir et al. and the study
I conducted to determine the generalizability of Katzir et al. and investigate whether the
distinct motivational role of different positive emotions modulates their effect on executive
function.
Executive Functions: Inhibition
The purpose of executive functions is shifting mental sets, monitoring and updating
working memory representations, and inhibition of prepotent responses (Miyake et al., 2000).
One functional implication of executive functions is successful self-control or self-regulation
(Katzir et al., 2010). Self-control conflicts arise, for example, when a person faces a choice
between a long-term goal with large, delayed benefits, and a short-term goal, with smaller,
more immediate benefits (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Trope & Fishbach, 2000).
Executive functions serve adherence to long-term goals by inhibiting prepotent short-term
desires (Barkley, 2001), holding a goal and goal-related information in working memory
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(Kane et al., 2007), shielding goals from interference, and switching flexibly between goals
(Kessler & Meiran, 2008).
Barkley (2001) explored the relationship between the inhibition of short-term desires
and long-term goal attainment. Barkley pointed out that long-term goal attainment requires
self-regulation in order to resist the more immediate benefits of short-term goals. Response
inhibition is a prerequisite to self-regulation. According to Barkley, response inhibition may
occur at different stages of emitting a response. First, response inhibition can be applied to
the initial prepotent response to an event. Second, it can apply to interruption of an ongoing
response that is proving ineffective. Finally, response inhibition can serve to protect the
executive responses and the goal-directed behavior they generate from disruption by
competing events and responses through control of attention.
Of principle interest here is the relationship between inhibition at the prepotent stage
and long-term goal pursuit. Two tasks used to study prepotent response inhibition are the
antisaccade task and the Stroop task. A saccade may be an automatic or directed response to
a visual stimulus. In antisaccade tasks, a visual onset is presented and the participant is
required to make an eye movement away from the onset location to another target. The
antisaccade task was developed by Hallet (1978) to examine the mechanisms responsible for
generating automatic and goal-directed saccades. Katzir et al. provide one example of how
the task has subsequently been adapted to study inhibitory control. They presented a fixation
point in the middle of the screen. The visual distractor was then presented to one or the other
side of the fixation point, followed by a target stimulus on the other side. Then the distractor
disappeared, and a black square masked the target after brief presentation. The target
stimulus was an arrow pointing up, down, left, or right. Participants were required to
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respond with the direction of the arrow, and in order to do so, needed to inhibit their
prepotent response to the distractor. Incorrect responses to the direction of the arrow
indicated failure to inhibit the distractor.
Another task used to study prepotent response inhibition is the Stroop task. The
Stroop task is named for its inventor, John Ridley Stroop, who was concerned with
investigating interference (1935). In the classic Stroop task (Anderson, 2010), the participant
is presented with color names displayed in incongruent colors of ink. For example, the
participant would see the word “red” in blue ink or the word “green” in red ink. The
participant’s task is to name the color of the ink, while ignoring the word. The researcher
measures how quickly and accurately the participant is able to name the ink color and
interprets a longer delay as an indicator of interference. Stroop found that participants took
longer to name the color of the ink when it was incongruent with the word than when the
color of the ink was congruent with the word. The Stroop task requires inhibitory control
because the participant must inhibit his or her prepotent response to the base word in order to
name the ink color.
Emotion and Inhibition
Inhibition is used to regulate emotion, but emotion might regulate inhibition as well.
The exact nature of the effect of emotion is debated, however, and there are different
hypotheses regarding the effect of happy mood on executive function tests. Ashby et al.
(1999) conducted a review of literature and hypothesized that positive emotion improves
cognition. By their theory, moderate levels of positive affect improve the executive
functions of working memory and cognitive set selection because of the accompanying
increase in dopamine release in the anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex – two brain
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structures that are involved in the executive functions. Ashby et al. based their theory on the
fact that dopamine controls the flow of information in the frontal lobes and that dopamine
disorders in this region cause decline in the executive functions of memory, attention, and
problem solving.
One source of data in support of Ashby et al.’s theory comes from patients with
Parkinson’s disease. When patients with Parkinson’s disease are given L-dopa, a precursor
to dopamine that increases dopamine levels, their working memory is improved (Lange et al.,
1992). By the same token, typical people with Parkinson’s disease who have reduced
dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex show memory deficits (Gotham, Brown, & Marsden,
1988). Ashby et al. draw the conclusion that working memory is optimized at some
intermediate dopamine level, but is compromised at low dopamine levels.
Alternatively, it has been argued that positive emotion impairs performance on
executive function tasks. Oaksford et al. (1996) used the Tower of London task to test
performance in a positive mood state. The Tower of London is a classic executive function
task that taps a wide range of executive functions, including planning, working memory,
attention, problem solving, inhibition, mental flexibility, initiation, and monitoring of actions.
Oaksford et al. found that induced positive mood impaired performance on the Tower of
London task compared to neutral mood. Oaksford et al. concluded that positive emotion
suppresses executive function task performance by reducing the cognitive resources available
for the task. Oaksford et al. predicted that negative emotion would have similar effects, but
were unable to achieve significant results for negative emotion. Oaksford et al.’s conclusion
regarding positive emotions is largely based on the resource allocation theory of emotion,
which holds that emotion leads to spontaneous retrieval of emotional material and this
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spontaneous retrieval may lead to task-irrelevant processing and subsequent depletion of
executive resources (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1987).
Like Oaksford et al., Phillips et al. (2002) found that positive mood impaired
executive task performance. Phillips et al. used the Stroop task as their test of inhibition and
compared four naming conditions: control, naming the color of ink in which words are
printed; color word reading, reading aloud color words printed in different color inks; the
classic Stroop condition, naming the color of ink in which incompatible color words are
printed; and switching between naming color of ink and reading color words. Participants
were either in a neutral mood or induced into a positive mood using the mood-memory
technique, in which they were asked to identify an occasion on which they experienced a
high level of happiness, to think about that event, describe it to the experimenter, and to
answer further questions about the event. For the neutral mood condition, participants
engaged in the same induction activities, but for a neutral event. Participants then completed
the Stroop task for all four naming conditions. Phillips et al. found that being in a happy
mood resulted in significantly slower performance on the alternating condition of the Stroop
task and Stroop cost that approached significance in each of the other conditions. They
found that either positive mood impairs performance compared to neutral mood on tasks that
require a higher executive load or that positive mood causes particular impairment on
attentional switching because attention is more likely to be distracted by thoughts that
maintain a positive mood.
Emotion and Motivation
Katzir et al. were interested in the influence of different positive emotions on
inhibition. They proposed a theory by which associations between distinct positive emotions
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and goals modulate the influence of emotional events on the executive system. Specifically,
they believed that happiness, because it is linked to short-term goals, decreases inhibition
compared to pride, because it is linked to long-term goals. Katzir et al.’s theory was based
on evidence that imagined pride and imagined happiness influence the executive function of
inhibition differently. Eyal and Fishbach in an unpublished paper (2010; as cited by Katzir et
al.) found that the emotions of pride and self-worth are implicitly associated with long-term
goals. In their experiment, Eyal and Fishbach compared the performance of participants
exposed to words related to happiness or asked to write about a future event likely to evoke
happiness and participants exposed to words related to pride or asked to write about a future
event likely to evoke pride. Eyal and Fishbach compared happiness and pride participants in
their subsequent persistence on a “difficult task” (the details of which are not available) or
their resistance to consumption of chocolate. Eyal and Fishbach found that participants
exposed to words related to happiness or asked to write about a future event likely to evoke
happiness, exercised less self-control in the difficult task or chocolate consumption task than
participants exposed to words related to pride or asked to write about a future event likely to
evoke pride. Eyal and Fishbach concluded that happiness is implicitly related to short-term
goals (i.e. escaping a difficult task, giving in to the allure of chocolate), whereas pride is
implicitly related to long-term goals (i.e. persisting on a difficult task, resisting the
temptation of chocolate). While Eyal and Fishbach’s results are intriguing, their study is
difficult to evaluate because it is unpublished and Katzir et al. did not provide adequate
details regarding the emotional manipulations and task requirements.
Williams and DeSteno (2008) found a similar link between pride and long-term goals.
They found that that the emotion of pride mediates perseverance toward long-term goals
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despite initial short-term costs. In their study, Williams and DeSteno told participants they
were conducting in an experiment on individual differences in cognitive abilities involving
visual perception and mental rotation. Participants were also told that their performance on
the first task would be predictive of their performance on the second task. In the first task,
participants estimated the number of dots on a PC screen, but the task was designed so that
participants would not be able to confidently evaluate whether their estimate was correct.
After the task, the experimenter either gave participants acclaim or a high score in order to
manipulate participants’ sense of pride. It was hypothesized that participants given acclaim
would feel greater pride compared to participants given a high score.
Participants in the Williams and DeSteno study then moved on to a tedious mental
rotation task and were instructed to complete as many exercises as they wanted, to stop any
time, and to consider that there were too many exercises to be completed in the time
available. Following this task, participants completed a manipulation check that confirmed
that participants given acclaim felt more pride compared to participants given score
information. Williams and DeSteno found that participants who had been given prideinducing acclaim persisted longer in the mental rotation task than participants who had been
given performance information. In a second experiment, Williams and DeSteno compared
the mental rotation task performance of participants who received acclaim with participants
who were induced into a positive mood and found that, again, participants who received
acclaim and subsequently felt pride persisted longer in the task. Williams and DeSteno
interpreted their findings to show that the emotion of pride is motivational and serves as an
incentive to persevere in a task (i.e. a long-term goal) despite short-term costs; in this case,
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the cost was continuing the difficult task and not enjoying the relaxation benefit of ceasing
the task.
One important aspect of Williams and DeSteno is unclear. It is doubtful that
persisting in a difficult task is actually a long-term goal. Working on a difficult task clearly
takes longer and requires more effort than ceasing a difficult task, but persisting on a task for
several minutes does not fit our usual conception of long-term goals.
Katzir et al. on Emotion and Inhibition
Katzir et al. predicted that pride and happiness would influence executive functions
based on the hypothesized links between pride and long-term goals and between happiness
and short-term goals. They predicted that imagining a future event of happiness would
decrease inhibitory control compared to imagining a future event of pride because imagined
happiness would prime short-term goals and imagined pride would prime long-term goals.
These predictions hinge on two hypotheses: first, on the hypothesis that pride and long-term
goals are implicitly linked and that happiness and short-term goals are implicitly linked (Eyal
& Fishbach, 2010; as cited by Katzir et al.); and second, on the hypothesis that executive
functions serve adherence to long-term goals by inhibiting prepotent short-term desires
(Barkley, 2001). If long-term goals are primed, inhibitory mechanisms are presumably
activated. If long-term goals are not primed, or if short-term goals are primed, then
inhibitory mechanisms will not be activated and inhibitory control will suffer.
Two potentially problematic issues are not clearly addressed by Katzir et al. First,
they did not explicitly define long- and short-term goals. Based on their experimental design
explained below, they implicitly define short-term goals as those that offer immediate
gratification and long-term goals as those that offer delayed gratification. The definition of

12

EMOTION & INHIBITION
long- and short-term goals cannot be taken for granted because in different contexts, these
terms can carry different meanings. For example, in our commonplace conception of goals,
long-term goals refer to what may be attained in the distant future, whereas short-term goals
refer to what may be attained in the near future. Katzir et al., however, seem to be using a
definition of long- and short-term goals based on the proximity of gratification to the action
taken.
Second, Katzir et al. did not acknowledge that both long-term and short-term goals
are vulnerable to interference and may require inhibition. If you are playing in a piano
recital, for example, and your short-term goal is to finish your piece correctly, then you must
inhibit a respond to someone taking a picture with flash in order to achieve your goal. This is
problematic for Katzir et al. because it seems to narrow their definition of short-term goals to
what may be attained in the near future without inhibition. This definition excludes willful
actions toward short-term goals, which is not the definition I believe Katzir et al. intended. It
is perhaps more accurate to characterize their conception of short-term goals as what may be
attained in the near future with less inhibition over time than long-term goals.
In order to test their prediction that happiness would decrease inhibition compared to
pride, Katzir et al. used an antisaccade task as a measure of inhibition. In Experiment 1,
there were three participant conditions. In the first condition, participants were asked to
write about a future experience they expected to evoke feelings of happiness and fun. In the
second condition, they were asked to write about a future experience they expected to evoke
feelings of pride and self-worth. In the third condition, participants were asked to imagine an
emotionally neutral event. In order to strengthen the imagined emotion, participants were
exposed to pictures of individuals expressing the corresponding emotions. All participants
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then completed the antisaccade task. In order “to increase [the] inhibitory challenge” (p.
1315), Katzir et al. used all male participants and used pictures of female models in bathing
suits as the distractor that participants needed to make a saccade away from. Katzir et al.
predicted that participants who imagined a happiness-eliciting event would perform less well
on the antisaccade task compared to participants who imagined a pride-eliciting event
because imagining happiness primes short-term goals, whereas pride primes long-term goals.
The dependent measure was the proportion of correct responses (correct identification of the
direction of the target arrow) on the antisaccade task.
Consistent with their hypothesis, Katzir et al. found a smaller proportion of correct
responses in the imagined-happiness condition than in both the imagined-pride condition and
the neutral condition. Katzir et al. also found, however, that there was no difference in the
proportion of correct responses in the imagined-pride and control conditions, which was
contrary to their hypothesis that the consideration of pride-eliciting events would increase
inhibition compared to the neutral condition. Katzir et al. realized a limitation: the use of
models in bathing suits as a distractor might have led participants in the imagined-happiness
condition to gaze longer at those happiness-eliciting pictures, resulting in poorer
performance.
In order to rule out the possibility that imagined happiness increased the tendency to
gaze longer at pictures related to happiness rather than decreasing the inhibition of any
distractors, Katzir et al. conducted Experiment 2 in which they used distractor pictures
related to happiness as well as related to pride. In this study, half of the participants were in
the happy mood condition and performed the antisaccade task with happiness pictures – the
models in bathing suits – while the other half performed were in the pride mood condition
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and performed the task with pride pictures – images of national pride and achievement
symbols such as images of the Israeli flag, medals, and graduation symbols. If the
participants in the imagined-happiness condition were gazing at happiness pictures longer
because of their relationship to the imagined emotion, then pride participants would gaze at
pride pictures longer and the effect observed in Experiment 1 would disappear. Katzir et al.
predicted, however, that imagining happiness would decrease inhibition regardless of
distractor content. In other words, they did not expect the effect reported in Experiment 1 to
interact with the distractor condition. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except
that there was no neutral control condition in Experiment 2.
Katzir et al. replicated the results of Experiment 1 with the proportion of correct
responses smaller in the imagined-happiness condition than in the imagined-pride condition.
They found that the effect of imagined emotion on inhibition was independent of distractor
content, ruling out the explanation that imagined happiness increased tendency to gaze at
"pleasurable” pictures rather than impairing inhibition (p.1318).
Katzir et al. attributed their results to the possibility that some imagined emotions
influence inhibition while others do not. They also propose the possibility that in the
academic setting in which the study was conducted, pride and long-term goals are
continuously activated, making the neutral condition in fact more similar to the imaginedpride condition. Katzir et al. ultimately concluded that imagining events that elicit positive
emotions differentially affect inhibition, a mechanism enabling self-regulation. They
believed that because pride is linked to long-term goals and happiness is linked to short-term
goals, imagining future events likely to elicit those emotions either increases or decreases
inhibition respectively.
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Katzir et al.’s theory that distinct emotions affect executive function differently due to
their motivational role requires more supporting evidence. Besides limited supporting
research, Katzir et al. had several limitations in their study. First, they used all male
participants and images of female models as their distractors in order to increase the
inhibitory challenge. Images of female models may be distracting to males in particular
because they are sexually arousing, not simply because they are related to happiness. This
would be problematic because participants in Experiment 2 were divided such that the
participants in the happiness condition saw only images of female models in bathing suits
and people in the pride condition saw only symbols of pride, so it is possible that participants
in the happiness condition did not perform as well because the stimuli was sexually arousing.
Second, Katzir et al. had a neutral emotion condition, but did not have a condition with
neutral distractor content. Without a neutral distractor condition, it is be impossible to
measure a baseline level of inhibition. A baseline is important because it would show how
distracting images are in general for people in different emotional conditions. Finally, Katzir
et al. only used one type of inhibition task. To ensure the validity of their results, it is
important for their findings to generalize to another task.
For my thesis, I tested whether Katzir et al.’s findings generalized to the Stroop task,
another executive function task that taps prepotent response inhibition. I used the classic
color-naming Stroop task. Before participants completed the Stroop task, I induced them
into imagined-happiness, imagined-pride, or neutral emotion conditions using the same
method as Katzir et al. This method consisted of instructing participants to imagine a
happiness-eliciting, pride-eliciting, or neutral event and exposing participants to images of
people displaying the corresponding emotions. The dependent measure was reaction time to
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indicate the color of the words. Longer reaction time presumably indicated that participants
had difficulty inhibiting the base word to indicate its color.
If Katzir et al.’s theory was correct, I expected to see longer reaction times for
participants in the imagined-happiness condition. Because Katzir et al. has limited support
and several limitations that might have exaggerated their results, I predicted that their
findings would not generalize to another task. I believed that I would find the general effect
that positive mood impairs inhibition, resulting in longer reaction times for both imaginedhappiness and imagined-pride compared to controls, but without significant difference
between reaction times for imagined-happiness and imagined-pride. I based this prediction
on Phillips et al.’s finding that positive mood impaired inhibition on various Stroop task
conditions and their suggestion that positive mood interferes with attention.
Method
Participants
Participants were a convenience sample of 45 students of the Claremont Colleges (24
women, 21 men) who volunteered to take part in a study about emotion and inhibition. The
participants were randomly assigned to happiness, pride, or neutral emotion conditions. Each
emotion condition was comprised of 15 participants.
Materials
The images used in the emotional manipulation were of men and women who
appeared happy, proud, and neutral taken from Tracy, Robins, & Schriber (2009) and were
the same images used in Katzir et al. The Stroop task was adapted from Stroop (1935) and
programmed using SuperLab. The base-words were “red,” “blue,” “green,” and “yellow” and
were presented in red, blue, green, or yellow font. A congruent trial consisted of a base-word
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presented in a font color that matched the word. For example, the word “red” presented in red
font. An incongruent trial consisted of a base-word presented in a font color that did not
match the word. For example, “red” presented in blue font. There were 96 trials: 4
presentations of 12 types of incongruent trials and 12 presentations of 4 types of congruent
trials. Words were programmed in 48-point font and each word was followed by a 500
millisecond inter-stimulus interval (ISI). Participants indicated the color of the font using a
keyboard.
Procedure
The procedure was adapted from Katzir et al. and the independent variable was
emotional condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: pride,
happiness, or neutral. The first part of the experiment was an emotional manipulation.
Participants were instructed to describe an event that would make them feel pride and selfworth (pride condition) or happiness and joy if it happened in the near future (happiness
condition), or how their room would look in the near future (control condition). Participants
were then exposed to four pictures of individuals (two male and two female) with proud,
happy, or neutral expressions corresponding to the participant’s emotion condition, presented
from the waist up (Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009). In order to mask the intent of the
image presentation, participants were asked to rate each picture on brightness and sharpness
(7-point scale: -3 = not sharp/not bright, 3 = sharp/bright).
After the emotion induction, participants completed the Stroop task to measure
inhibition success. Participants in all conditions were instructed to press a specific keyboard
key, as quickly as possible, corresponding to the ink color of the presented base-word and
response time (RT) was recorded. Upon completion of the task, participants were debriefed
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as to the purpose of the experiment. RTs below 200 milliseconds and above 2000
milliseconds as well as erroneous responses were excluded from data analysis. The
dependent measure was percent increase in RT between the congruent and incongruent trails
which I represented as the Stroop interference score for each participant; Stroop interference
= mean RT incongruent – mean RT congruent)/mean RT congruent in percent.
Results
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotional condition on
Stroop interference after pride, happiness, or neutral emotion manipulations. There was a
marginally significant effect of emotional condition on Stroop interference for the three
conditions [F(2, 42) = 2.98, p = 0.06]. Post hoc LSD comparisons indicated a significant
difference between the pride condition (M = 6.58%, SD = 6.50%) and the neutral condition
(M = 13.17%, SD = 9.09%). There was no significant difference between the pride condition
and the happiness condition (M = 9.76%, SD = 6.29%). Neither was there a significant
difference between the happiness and neutral conditions.
Discussion
This experiment was designed to determine whether Katzir et al.’s finding that
happiness decreased inhibition compared to pride or neutral emotion could be replicated in
another prepotent response inhibition task, the Stroop task. My first prediction was that
Katzir et al.’s findings would not generalize to another task because Katzir et al. had several
limitations and potentially exaggerated results. My second prediction was that I would find a
general effect that positive mood impairs inhibition compared to neutral mood based on
evidence that positive mood interferes with attention (Phillips et al., 2002). Contrary to my
predictions, I found that participants in the pride condition had a significantly smaller
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average Stroop interference scores compared to participants in the neutral condition. I
interpret this difference to indicate increased inhibitory function for people experiencing
pride. I did not find significant differences in Stroop interference between the pride and
happiness conditions or happiness and neutral conditions. I interpret this result to show that
people experiencing happiness or neutral emotion had comparable levels of inhibitory
function. Both the significant and insignificant results failed to support my hypotheses that
Katzir et al.’s results would not generalize and that positive mood would impair inhibition
compared to neutral mood.
Although my prediction that Katzir et al.’s findings would fail to generalize was
incorrect, my results only partially support Katzir et al.’s theory. Katzir et al.’s primary
significant result was that participants in the happiness condition showed decreased
inhibitory functioning compared to participants in both the pride and neutral conditions as
measured by proportion of correct responses on an antisaccade task. My results, on the other
hand, showed that participants in the pride condition had increased inhibitory function
compared to the neutral condition, but not compared to the happiness condition. While my
results do not match the pattern of Katzir et al.’s results, they do support the aspect of Katzir
et al.’s theory that holds that pride increases inhibitory function. My results, however, do not
support the aspect of Katzir et al.’s theory that holds that happiness decreases inhibition
compared to pride.
The first possible explanation for my mixed results is that the emotional manipulation
for pride may have been stronger than the emotional manipulation for happiness. During the
emotional manipulation, participants in the pride condition were asked to describe an event
that would make them feel pride and self-worth if it happened in the near future. Many
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participants wrote about graduation or securing jobs and internships. Participants in the
happiness condition were asked to describe an event that would make them feel happiness
and joy if it happened in the near future. Many participants in this condition wrote about
seeing pets or visiting family. It is possible that the events described in the pride condition
evoke a stronger emotion than the events described in the happiness condition because they
are more consequential and affect the rest of a person’s life. Interestingly, participants in
both the pride and happiness conditions wrote about receiving good grades. This crossover
points to the possibility that the emotions felt in the pride and happiness conditions are
related. If participants in the happiness condition felt an emotion that is closer to pride than
to happiness, then there would likely be no significant difference in participants’ inhibitory
functioning between pride and happiness, as the results indicated.
Happiness and pride are two positive emotions that are difficult to tease apart. One
way of drawing a more distinct line between the two would be to prompt participants with
the sort of events the experimenter considers “happy” and events the experimenter considers
“proud.” For example, the prompt for happiness might suggest events such as having a piece
of candy or watching a favorite television show, while the prompt for pride might suggest
events such as graduation or earning a good grade. This strategy seems likely to elicit more
distinct responses for happiness and pride, but another possibility is that my results show that
the natural distinction between happiness and pride is too blurred for people to be able to
consider the emotions independently. If this is the case, then the emotions of happiness and
pride do not constitute truly independent variables and the entire premise of Katzir et al.’s
theory – the distinction between happiness and pride – is challenged.
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The second possible explanation for my results and inability to fully confirm or
contradict Katzir et al.’s theory is that the methodological differences between my
experiment and Katzir et al.’s experiment may have been too great. Katzir et al. used an
antisaccade task, but I used a Stroop task with the goal of determining whether their results
would generalize to a different inhibition task. Both the antisaccade task and the Stroop task
test prepotent response inhibition, but prepotent response inhibition may be multifaceted. It
is possible that the antisaccade task taps a different aspect of inhibition than the Stroop task
in which case, results from the antisaccade task would not be expected to generalize to the
Stroop task at all.
A more likely methodological explanation for the differences in my and Katzir et al.’s
results is that Katzir et al.’s limitations created the circumstances necessary to see their
results. One of Katzir et al.’s limitations included the confounding of sexual arousal and
happiness by the use of female models in bathing suits as distractors for participants who
were all male. The sexual component of Katzir et al.’s study may have created a type of
distraction much different than the type of distraction created by an incongruent color/word
stimulus in the Stroop task. In Katzir et al.’s first experiment, they only used pictures of
female models in bathing suits for their distractor images and in their second experiment they
used these “happy” images for participants in the happiness condition and used proud
images, such as national and graduation symbols for participants in the pride condition and
found no difference related to the content of the distractor images. The sexual nature of the
distractors for the happiness condition might have been necessary to achieve their results. A
second limitation of Katzir et al. is that they did not use any neutral distractor content to find
a baseline level of distraction in their task. Because Katzir et al. did not find differences due
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to distractor content, I supposed that distractor content should be irrelevant and used only
neutral stimuli in my experiment. It is possible that inhibition of emotionally salient material
is different than inhibition of neutral material. Emotional stimuli capture more attention than
neutral stimuli, so it is possible that if I had used words related to pride and happiness rather
than neutral words, I might have achieved more dramatic results or results more similar to
Katzir et al.
Emotional distractor stimuli might have been just the right choice in Katzir et al.
because long-term and short-term goals have an emotional component and in pursuit of these
goals, emotional distractors would be the most relevant and salient. For example, the goal
might be graduating or the goal might be having a piece of cake. Both goals are emotional in
their own ways and would require the pursuer to inhibit appealing distractions with
emotional implications, such as hanging out with friends or stopping to stare at a bikini-clad
girl on the lawn. In pursuit of the original goals, neutral distractors would likely be less
salient and easier to inhibit. For Katzir et al., this would mean that participants primed for
short-term or long-term goals with happy or proud implications would be more distracted by
interesting, competing emotional stimuli than by neutral, basically irrelevant stimuli.
In future research, I would use the same method, but I would use happiness, pride,
and neutral words in case the use of emotional stimuli accounts for the differences between
my results and Katzir et al.’s results. Another possibility would be to use the same
antisaccade task as Katzir et al., but use neutral stimuli. This method would eliminate the
possible confounding of sexual arousal and happiness found in Katzir et al. and would be
sure to tap the same inhibitory mechanism as Katzir et al. if it is the case that antisaccade
tasks require a different inhibitory mechanism than Stroop tasks. Future research on positive
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emotion and inhibition should seek to determine whether Katzir et al. are working with a
significant distinction between happiness and pride, whether there are reliable connections
between happiness and short-term goals and pride and long-term goals, and whether the
effect of different positive emotions may be generalized. Further evidence is needed in
support of the motivational power of positive emotion and its effect on inhibition.
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